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GENOMIC PATENTS AND PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
REBECCA S. EISENBERG
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Ml.

Patents on human genetic information have been controversial among
different groups for different reasons. The purpose of a patent system is to
motivate the commercial development of new technologies; it is thus
unsurprising that those who have fundamental misgivings about commercial
biotechnology would oppose gene patents. More intriguing is the
controversy over gene patenting among those who welcome the commercial
development of biotechnology products by private firms. While many
proponents of commercial biotechnology assert that gene patents are
essential to motivate product development, some have expressed more
nuanced views, endorsing patents under some circumstances and
condemning them as unnecessary or even counterproductive in others.
The most striking example of this ambivalence has been the opposition -some of it from industry trade groups and entrepreneurs -- to patent filings
on cDNA fragments (exprensed sequence tags or ESTs). Perhaps it was this
outspoken opposition, from sources beyond the usual suspects, that provoked
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to take the extraordinary
measure of calling for public comments on the question of "[whether] the
patenting of human genome fragments [would] inhibit rather than promote
advancement of the biotechnology arts[, and] if so, why7" 1 The PTO
promptly repented of its unwonted foray into open-ended questions of
public policy and cancelled the request for comments within two weeks, 2 it
subsequently issued a revised request for comments that was more narrowly
focused on the administrative burden and costs associated with examining
applications containing large numbers of sequences or excessively long
sequences, with no mention of broader policy questions. 3 Yet the question
the PTO originally posed remains important and unanswered.
More recently, as human genomic sequencing gets underway, the National
Center for Human Genome Research (NCHGR) has taken the unusual step of
discouraging grantees from patenting "large blocks of human primary DNA
sequence", advising that it considers "raw human genomic DNA sequence, in
the absence of additional demonstrated biological information ...
inappropriate material for patent filing" and that patent applications on such
sequences "could have a chilling effect on the development of future
inventions of useful products." While acknowledging that the Bayh-Dole Act

374

REBECCA S. EISENBERG

gives grantees the right to elect to retain title to inventions made with federal
funds and to apply for patents, NCHGR has admonished its grantees that it
"will monitor grantee activity in this area" and that it may consider making a
detennination of "exceptional circumstance" (required under the Bayh-Dole
Act before an agency may restrict the right of grantees to retain patent rights
to discoveries) in the future if necessary "to ensure that sequence generated
by these grants is maximally useful to the research and commercial sectors."
Given that pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms are big users of the
patent system, it may seem surprising that they do not join together in an
equivocal endorsement of gene patents. What can we make of this debate?
Are gene patents good for business or bad for business? More specifically,
how will the existence or absence of patents on human DNA sequences affect
the incentives of private firms to develop commercial products that emerge
from knowledge of such sequences?
The answer to this question is likely to vary depending on the type of
product at issue and the type of firm whose incentives are under
consideration. Most firms involved in the development of biotechnology
products are both consumers of technology developed by others and
producers of technology embodied in products and processes that they hope
to sell to their own customers. Firms are more likely to view patent rights as
essential to their incentives when they cover the technology they sell to their
own customers than when they cover technology that they need to acquire
from others.
This is entirely unsurprising given the function of patents. A patent
confers a monopoly in a new invention for a limited tenn, allowing sellers of
products embodying new technologies to charge higher prices by excluding
competitors from the market. This is how patents motivate firms to invest in
R&D, an investment that might be unprofitable if free riders were permitted
to enter the market for new technologies that prove successful without having
shared in the initial cost and risk. But what makes patents attractive to finns is
the prospect of charging monopoly prices - not the prospect of paying them.
When R&D is conceived not as a single-firm enterprise culminating in the
creation of a patented end product for sale to consumers, but rather as a
more complex stream of successive innovations, in which firms use the
discoveries of others in the course of making their own discoveries, it is easy
to see how firms might disagree about the impact of patents at different
points in the stream on their own R&D incentives. Thus firms welcome the
patents that allow them to charge higher prices, while cursing the patents that
require them to pay higher prices. At any given point in the stream,
downstream patents motivate R&D, while upstream patents make it more
costly.
Patents on DNA sequences are thus likely to have different impacts on
firms that occupy different market niches in the biotechnology industry.
Finns that specialize in identifying novel DNA sequences are likely to be
motivated by patents on such sequences, while firms that use DNA sequences

GENOMIC PATENTS AND PRODUCT INCENTIVES

375

in their research as targets for drug discovery are more likely to be
indifferent or hostile to such patents. Thus a finn like Merck, that makes its
money primarily from the sale of small molecule drugs, is willing to dedicate
new DNA sequences to the public domain, while DNA-sequencing finns like
Human Genome Sciences and Incyte hold them as proprietary resources.
One finn's research tool is another firm's end product.
A complicating factor that changes the alignment of incentives somewhat
in the case of DNA sequences is government sponsorship of the Human
Genome Project. Governments presumably do not require patents to motivate
them to sponsor research in the public interest; one might therefore expect
that publicly-funded contributions to the stream of innovation could safely
be dedicated to the public domain to reduce the costs to firms of downstream
R&D. The prevailing wisdom is otherwise: since passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act 4 and the Stevenson-Wydler Act5 in the U.S. in 1980, recipients of
government research funds have generally been encouraged to patent their
inventions in order to promote their development as commercial products.
By discouraging its grantees from patenting raw genomic sequence data, for
the avowed purpose of averting "a chilling effect on the development of
future inventions of useful products", NCHGR is challenging the validity in
this particular setting of the ordinary presumption in favour of patents as a
mechanism for promoting product development. For better or worse, a likely
consequence of this move is that a considerable amount of DNA sequence
data will enter the public domain through the Human Genome Project.
Is this good or bad? In the absence of patents on DNA sequences, are we
likely to lose out on the development of new products? Or can finns be
expected to welcome free access to DNA sequences generated with
government funds as a subsidy for their own research? There is no simple,
obvious answer to this question, but we can engage in a bit of cautious
speculation. In all likelihood the bottom line will be uneven, favouring
incentives to develop some types of products, while diminishing incentives to
develop others.
Most likely to suffer from the absence of patents on DNA sequences are
therapeutic products that are closely related to the sequences (such as
therapeutic proteins that the sequences encode). Such products require costly
clinical testing before they may be brought to market, and finns have rarely
been willing to make such an investment in an unpatented product. A patent
on a DNA sequence encoding a therapeutic protein (which would typically
include claims to any recombinant vector or host cell incorporating the
sequence) allows the patent holder to exclude competitors from making the
encoded protein by recombinant means. In some case, process patents on
methods of using proteins for particular therapeutic purposes may be
adequate to ensure market exclusivity, but process patents are generally
considered less advantageous than product patents (and therefore provide
less motivation to invest in clinical testing). One problem with relying on
therapeutic process claims to protect a pharmaceutical product is that such a
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patent does not prevent competitors from making and selling the unpatented
product for other purposes. and thereby bringing down the price of the
product. In theory the owner of the process patent could still enjoin the
particular use of the product described in the patent claims. but it is
impractical to monitor what individual consumers are doing with a product
that is available from multiple sources for multiple uses. A patent on the
DNA sequence encoding the protein provides a direct remedy against any
competing firm that uses the sequence to manufacture the protein and thus is
a much more effective means of securing market exclusivity even after new
uses are found for the product.
As a general rule, incentives to develop diagnostic applications of DNA
sequences are likely to be less sensitive to the absence of patents on the
sequences themselves than incentives to develop therapeutic proteins. For one
thing, diagnostic products are less extensively regulated, and therefore
considerably cheaper to bring to market, than therapeutic products, reducing
the need for exclusive rights to recoup development costs. Second, process
patent claims may offer more effective commercial protection for diagnostics
than for therapeutics. While therapeutic products are widely distributed to
individual consumers whose activities are difficult to monitor, DNA
diagnostic services are typically supplied by a more limited number of
laboratories that a patent holder can more readily keep an eye on. Diagnostic
laboratories might be able to infringe a process patent surreptitiously, but so
might they infringe a product patent on a DNA sequence used in a
diagnostic test. Thus in contrast to the therapeutic setting, in the diagnostic
setting product patents do not clearly offer a more efficacious remedy than
process patents. Moreover, a DNA diagnostic product may be less likely than
a therapeutic protein to have multiple uses that would leave the patent holder
vulnerable to competition from other suppliers.
Nonetheless, some DNA diagnostic products may be quite costly to
develop, and the absence of patent rights on DNA sequences may undermine
incentives to develop such products. For example, developing tests for
genetic susceptibility to certain diseases may require identification of
numerous mutations, particularly in the case of complex polygenic disorders.
Moreover, the use of such tests has been controversial, and it is entirely
possible that ethical concerns raised by genetic susceptibility testing may
ultimately lead to further regulatory measures that increase the risks and
costs associated with commercial development of such products. Patents on
DNA sequences may help motivate firms to develop diagnostic products in
the face of these risks and costs.
Least likely to suffer from the absence of patents on a DNA sequence are
incentives to develop products that are only indirectly related to the DNA
sequence (such as a small molecule drug for which the DNA sequence, or the
peptide it encodes, is a target). Such products are far enough downstream
from the identification of the DNA sequence itself that a patent on the DNA
sequence is unlikely to provide innovating firms with a source of exclusive
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rights in the products they ultimately bring to market, yet DNA sequence
patents could impose royalty obligations on innovating firms that make R&D
more costly. More important to the profit expectations of the firms that bring
these products to market is the prospect of obtaining patents on their own
end products the small molecules that they hope to sell to consumers.
The impact on product development incentives of placing DNA sequences
in the public domain thus depends in part on what type of product is at issue,
and whether other patent rights are likely to preserve for an innovating firm
an exclusive position in the market for that product. In addition, the presence
or absence of patents on DNA sequences may be more or less significant to
different types of firms.
Both established pharmaceutical firms and younger biotechnology firms
are likely to be sensitive to patent incentives, but their interests in the patent
system are not exactly the same. Young biotechnology firms typically have a
problem that established pharmaceutical firms don't need to worry about: if
they are not yet earning significant revenues by selling products to
consumers, they need to raise funds from other sources to keep their research
operations moving forward. For these firms, a patent portfolio may be critical
at an early stage in their R&D efforts in order to attract financing from
investors or research partners; otherwise they will lack the resources to
continue the effort, and they will never have any products to sell. But the
discoveries available for patenting at this early stage may be far upstream
from a final product.
Established pharmaceutical firms are also very sensitive to intellectual
property rights, but for different reasons, and at a different stage in the R&D
process. Pharmaceutical firms typically have no need to go to the capital
markets to fund their research; they are already selling products and can
fund their next generation of research projects out of profits on existing
products. They are therefore less likely than cash-poor biotechnology firms
to require patent rights on early stage research discoveries that are
far-removed from the marketplace, so long as they anticipate a strong
enough patent position further downstream to ensure them of an effective
commercial monopoly in the products they sell to consumers at the end of
the day.
Thus although both big pharmas and smaller biotech firms want patent
rights in the products they sell to their consumers, biotech firms are more
likely to require patents on discoveries made further upstream in the R&D
process as well in order to attract research funding. For this reason, the
absence of patent rights on DNA sequences may undermine the incentives of
smaller, younger firms to develop products that would still be attractive to
larger, more established firms. The presence or absence of patents on DNA
sequences may thus determine not only what type of product is profitable to
develop, but also what type of firm is able to summon the resources for
product development.
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